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Equity-based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Tax Avoidance 
 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the effect of outside directors’ compensation on a firm’s tax 
behavior. The board of directors bears the responsibility of protecting shareholder interests 
and maximizing firm value. One way to increase shareholder wealth is through effective tax 
management as tax savings can improve the bottom line of a firm.1 Accordingly, there is 
considerable research studying the effects of various board characteristics on corporate tax 
behavior (Armstrong et al. 2015; Minnick and Noga 2010; Lanis and Richardson 2011; 
Richardson et al. 2013; Robinson et al. 2012). These studies, focusing on the financial 
expertise and independence of the board, generally find that tax avoidance is associated with 
these board attributes. However, the literature has paid less attention to the potential effects of 
directors’ most direct incentives arising from their compensation structure. In this paper, we 
examine whether outside directors’ equity-based compensation (hereafter DEC) is associated 
with the firm’s tax avoidance. 
The literature suggests that executive compensation incentives have a significant effect 
on firms’ tax avoidance behavior. Phillips (2003) finds that compensation for business unit 
managers based on after-tax income is associated with a lower effective tax rate. Similarly, 
Armstrong et al. (2012) find a negative association between incentive compensation for tax 
directors and GAAP effective tax rates. Rego and Wilson (2012) document that more equity 
risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk, whereas Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
find that increases in incentive compensation reduce the level of tax sheltering. Overall the 
abovementioned studies document managerial equity incentives as an important determinant 
                                                     
1 Prior studies argue that there is an optimal level of tax planning/avoidance for a firm to maximize shareholder 
value (Slemrod 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Armstrong et al. 2015). Therefore, in this paper we use the 
term tax management, tax planning, and tax avoidance interchangeably.   
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of tax avoidance behavior. As tax decisions are usually approved by the board of directors, 
directors’ compensation incentives should play an essential role in shaping a firm’s tax 
avoidance strategy.  
Outside directors are often regarded as independent monitors and charged with 
overseeing managers’ decision-making process. Yermack (2004) suggests that reputation and 
compensation are two major sources of incentives for outside directors to protect 
shareholders. As the value of a firm increases, outside directors are rewarded with higher 
compensation and additional board seats in other companies (presumably due to good 
reputation). Shareholder activists tend to advocate the use of incentive-based compensation to 
motivate directors to monitor management in the long-run interest of shareholders. The 
NACD (2001, 2003) specifically recommends that at least half of director compensation be in 
the form of equity, including stock options and restricted stock grants. Supporting these 
advocates, survey studies provide evidence that large U.S. companies have increased the use 
of stock options and stock grants to compensate their outside directors (Monks and Minow, 
2001; Taub, 2005; Winikoff, 2006). 
Equity-based compensation can provide outside directors with two types of incentives 
which could lead to contrasting behavior. On one hand, as the directors’ wealth sensitivity to 
firm performance becomes higher, DEC will increase their incentives to monitor management 
more diligently (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Ryan and Wiggins 2004). The increased 
monitoring could lead to more effective tax management, which drives higher firm profit. On 
the other hand, as directors’ equity stake in a company rises, they may focus on maximizing 
the value of their own compensation package rather than protecting shareholder interests. 
Such personal benefit incentives resulting from DEC will jeopardize directors’ independence 
and exacerbate the agency problem (Archer 2003; Stout 2003). Absent effective monitoring 
and oversight, managers have lower incentives to engage in tax planning which would 
otherwise allow them to extract private rents (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). Based on the 
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above discussions, whether DEC ultimately has a positive or negative influence on tax 
avoidance is an empirical question.   
Our empirical analyses use ExecuComp’s director-level compensation data for 2006 
through 2015. Following prior studies, we use two commonly used measures of tax 
avoidance: cash effective tax rate (cash ETR) and GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP ETR), 
both calculated over a three-year period.2 Moreover, we employ an instrumental variable 
approach to mitigate the endogeneity concern of director equity incentives. The two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimation shows that firms paying a higher fraction of their outside 
director compensation in the form of equity have lower cash ETR and GAAP ETR. This 
finding is consistent with the argument that DEC increases outside directors’ monitoring 
incentive and facilitates a better tax management strategy. Our results are robust to using the 
dollar value of total equity compensation (as opposed to a ratio-based measure) and using 
alternative tax avoidance measures including current-year cash ETR, current-year GAAP 
ETR, and unrecognized tax benefits.  
We conduct additional tests to examine the cross-sectional variations of the relation 
between outside director equity incentives and tax avoidance. First, we find that the positive 
association between DEC and tax avoidance is more pronounced in firms adopting the 
defender-type business strategy relative to those adopting the prospector-type business 
strategy. Given prior findings that defender firms engage a higher level of tax avoidance 
(Higgins et al. 2015; Hsu et al. 2018), our results suggest that DEC enhances outside 
directors’ monitoring role so that firms adopt a tax planning strategy which fits the business 
strategy. Second, we find some evidence that the relation between DEC and tax avoidance is 
stronger in firms that are more financially constrained, consistent with financial constraints 
forcing managers to make more effective tax planning.  
                                                     
2 Prior studies suggest that, relative to one-year ETR, ETR calculated over a longer horizon better reflects a 
firm’s tax planning effectiveness (Dyreng et al 2008).  
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Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the debate 
regarding the impact of director equity incentives on corporate outcomes. Some studies show 
that DEC increases firm performance (Becher et al. 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2005; Perry 
1999), improves disclosure quality and reduces cost of capital (Sengupta and Zhang 2015). 
However, other studies document that firms with higher DEC are more likely to incur option 
backdating (Minnick and Zhao 2009) and accounting irregularities (Archambeault et al., 
2008; Boumosleh, 2009; Cullinan et al. 2008, 2010). Our findings that DEC is positively 
associated with tax avoidance provide additional evidence which supports the role of director 
equity incentives in facilitating better tax planning outcomes.  
Second, our paper adds to the literature studying the effects of corporate governance and 
compensation incentives on tax avoidance. Prior research finds that managerial incentives 
play an important role in influencing corporate tax behavior (Armstrong et al. 2012, 2015; 
Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Minnick and Noga 2010; Rego and Wilson 2012). In addition, 
better corporate governance mechanisms such as higher independence and greater financial 
expertise of the board or audit committee members tend to be associated with a higher level 
of tax avoidance (Armstrong et al. 2015; Moore et al. 2017; Robinson et al. 2012). We 
complement this literature by showing a positive effect of director equity incentives on tax 
avoidance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
develops research hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and research methodology. Section 
4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses additional analyses. Section 6 provides 
concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Board Characteristics and Tax Avoidance 
Researchers propose that tax planning is a value-enhancing activity and that tax 
avoidance is valued by shareholders (Cook et al. 2017; Graham and Tucker 2006; Slemrod 
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2004). Given the importance of tax management to shareholder value, prior literature shows 
that firms engage in varying levels of tax avoidance activities, which are affected by various 
firm-level characteristics (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Dyreng et al. 2008). Several studies 
explore the role of various corporate governance dimensions as determinants of tax 
avoidance/aggressiveness, such as executive compensation (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Minnick and Noga 2010; Phillips 2003; Rego and Wilson 2012), institutional ownership 
(Chen et al. 2010; Khurana and Moser 2013), and family firm status (Chen et al. 2010; Moore 
et al. 2017; Steijvers and Niskanen 2014).  
From an agency perspective, the board of directors plays a critical role in advising 
corporate strategy and monitoring executives’ decisions to maximize shareholder interests 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). On the one hand, risk-averse managers may avoid tax avoidance 
activities that involve significant uncertainty, even if the activities are expected to generate 
net benefits for shareholders (Rego and Wilson, 2012). On the other hand, managers may 
engage in complex and risky tax avoidance activities, possibly as a means of facilitating 
and/or hiding extraction of private benefits (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). Consequently, 
many studies explore how board characteristics affect firms’ tax behavior, with most research 
focusing on two attributes: independence and financial expertise.  
The extant empirical evidence is mixed regarding the effect of board independence on 
tax avoidance. In the context of noncompliant tax avoidance among Australian firms, Lanis 
and Richardson (2011) and Richardson et al. (2013) find that a higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board is negatively associated with tax aggressiveness. On the 
other hand, Moore et al. (2017) find a positive association between board independence and 
tax avoidance based on a sample of US firms. As for the effect of directors’ financial 
expertise, Armstrong et al. (2015) show that more financially sophisticated boards encourage 
more (less) aggressive tax positions for firms at the lower (upper) extreme of the tax 
avoidance continuum. In a similar vein, Robinson et al. (2012) find that audit committee 
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financial expertise is positively associated with overall tax planning but is negatively 
associated with the use of risky tax avoidance strategies.  
Research Hypothesis 
Jensen (1993) suggests that outside directors have stronger incentives to monitor top 
management if they hold substantial equity interests in the firm. Consistent with this 
argument, studies find that directors with a sizable equity stake in the firm are more likely to 
question management’s self-dealing proposals (Patton and Baker 1987) and dismiss poorly-
performing CEOs (Perry 1999). Fich and Shivdasani (2005) document that firms adopting 
option plans for outside directors experience significantly positive abnormal returns as well 
as favorable revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Sengupta and Zhang (2015) also show 
that higher equity-based compensation to outside directors is associated with better disclosure 
quality measured by more frequent and more accurate earnings guidance.  
Despite the argument that equity-based compensation helps align the interests of 
directors and shareholders, concerns exist about providing incentive-based pay to outside 
directors who should serve as independent monitors. Opponents of equity compensation 
argue that tying outside directors’ pay more closely to stock performance will jeopardize their 
independence and lead to biased judgement and ineffective monitoring in corporate decision-
making (Archer, 2003; Barrier, 2002; Dalton and Daily, 1999; Stout 2003; Magilke et al. 
2009). Supporting this perspective, studies find that higher equity-based pay to outside 
directors results in more earnings management and financial restatements (Archambeault et 
al., 2008; Boumosleh, 2009; Cullinan et al. 2008), weaker internal controls (Cullinan et al. 
2010), and a greater incidence of option backdating (Minnick and Zhao 2009), all of which 
hamper shareholder interests. 
Following the above discussions, the monitoring incentives from equity-based 
compensation might motivate outside directors to engage managers in more tax avoidance. In 
contrast, the private benefit resulting from equity incentives could also undermine outside 
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directors’ oversight quality as they focus on short-term self-interests. Given the contrasting 
effect, we develop a non-directional hypothesis as follows:  
H1: Equity-based compensation to outside directors is associated with corporate tax 
avoidance.  
3. Research Design 
Empirical Model 
Our hypothesis predicts that outside director equity incentives will affect corporate tax 
avoidance. However, the level and/or composition of director compensation might be 
endogenously determined (Rego and Wilson 2012). Therefore, we use the instrumental 
variable approach and two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation method to address the 
endogeneity issue.3 The formal models are specified as follows: 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝐷𝑀𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼15𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1/𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸_𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (2) 
In the first-stage, the dependent variable DECPCT is the proportion of equity-based 
incentives for outside directors. In the main analysis, we use the ratio of the sum of stock 
awards and option awards of each outside director divided by the director’s total 
compensation. This ratio is averaged across all outside directors of a firm for a particular 
                                                     
3 Hausman test also indicates the existence of endogeneity (Chi-squared statistic=4.63, p value=0.03), which 
suggests that 2SLS estimator is better than OLS estimator.  
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year. Using total compensation as a deflator is less scale dependent than other measures based 
on the dollar value of equity compensation. Nonetheless, in robustness tests we use the dollar 
amount of total equity compensation of outside directors as an alternative measure.  
We use two variables as the instruments in model (1): board meeting frequency 
(BDMTG) and total equity ownership by directors and executives (BDOWN). These 
instruments are shown to be determinants of director compensation (Boyd 1996; Cordeiro et 
al. 2000) but are less likely to be correlated with tax avoidance. We then use the predicted 
value of DECPCT from model (1) in the second-stage regression, denoted PRE_DECPCT, 
and test whether it has a significant effect on tax avoidance. As suggested by prior research 
(Larcker and Rusticus 2010), we also include the second-stage control variables in model (1).  
Consistent with prior literature (Chen et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010), in model (2) we measure tax avoidance by two broad and easy to understand 
measures: the cash effective tax rate (cash ETR) and the GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP 
ETR). Both measures capture the amount of tax firms pay relative to their pre-tax accounting 
income. Cash ETR is based on cash flows and reflects firms’ actual cash tax payments. 
GAAP ETR is based on GAAP tax expense which includes tax accruals for financial 
reporting purposes. We examine both types of effective tax rates because survey results in 
Graham et al. (2017) suggest that there is a potential variation among top management 
regarding which tax rates are used in corporate decisions. Prior research also suggests that 
long-run tax rate better captures a firm’s tax management ability despite isolated events 
(Dyreng et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2014), thus we compute both effective tax rates over a 
three-year period. Moreover, to control for the industry effect, we follow prior studies and use 
industry-adjusted effective tax rate as the dependent variable (Armstrong et al. 2015; Hsu et 
al. 2018; Minnick and Noga 2010). More specifically, CETR3Y (GETR3Y) in model (2) is 
calculated as the firm’s mean three-year cash ETR (GAAP ETR) minus the corresponding 
industry mean, with industry defined by the two-digit SIC code. 
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The control variables in model (2) are commonly used determinants of tax avoidance 
(Armstrong et al. 2015; Dyreng et al. 2010). SIZE is measured by the natural logarithm of net 
sales. LEV is measured by long-term debt divided by lagged total assets. TBQ refers to 
Tobin’s Q, calculated as the sum of market value of common stock, book value of preferred 
stock, and book value of total debt divided by book value of lagged total assets. RD is 
measured by research and development expense scaled by lagged total assets. INTAN is 
measured by total intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. CAPEX is measured by 
capital expenditures divided by lagged total assets. SGA is measured by selling, general and 
administrative expense scaled by lagged total assets. PTCFO is measured by pre-tax 
operating cash flows (net cash flows from operations plus cash taxes) scaled by lagged total 
assets. FOREIGN is an indicator equal to one if the firm reports foreign sales, and zero 
otherwise. LOSS is an indicator equal to one if the firm has net operating loss, and zero 
otherwise. DUALITY is an indicator equal to one if the CEO also serves as the board 
chairman, and zero otherwise. BDSIZE is the board size. COMPAGE is the firm age, 
measured by the number of years the firm has been included in Compustat. Finally, we 
control for industry and year fixed effects. All variable definitions are summarized in the 
Appendix. To mitigate the influence of potential outliers, we winsorize all continuous 
variables at the top and bottom one percentiles. In addition, standard errors are adjusted based 
on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances and are clustered by firm. 
Data and Sample Selection 
Our data come from several sources: financial data is obtained from Compustat, director 
compensation is obtained from Execuomp, and other director-related governance data is 
obtained from MSCI-GMI database.  
We start from an initial sample of firms covered by Compustat from 2006 to 2018, 
including 118,511 observations. Since we examine three-year effective tax rate, this 
requirement removes 49,954 observations with missing tax rate data and reduces our sample 
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period to 2006~2015. Following Dyreng et al. (2010), we exclude 15,546 observations that 
have negative effective tax rate. Next, we remove 40,547 observations not covered in 
Execucomp database. Finally, removing 4,932 observations with missing data on other 
empirical variables results in a final sample of 7,532 observations from 1,368 firms. The 
detailed sample selection process is summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 reports the breakdown of sample by year and by industry. Panel A shows that the 
number of firms are generally distributed evenly across the sample period. The industry 
breakdown in Panel B shows that our sample encompasses a broad cross-section of 
industries, with manufacturing industry accounting for the largest percentage (40.45%).  
[Table 2 Here] 
4. Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of key variables used in the main analyses. The 
mean (median) industry-adjusted cash ETR is -0.059 (-0.007), while the mean (median) 
industry-adjusted GAAP ETR is -0.176 (-0.006). These findings are comparable with those of 
prior studies (Hsu et al. 2018) and suggest that a majority of our sample firms have effective 
tax rates lower than the mean value of their corresponding industry. The descriptive statistics 
also show a large cross-sectional variation in both effective tax rate measures. The average 
percentage of equity-based compensation is 51.7% (median=53.2%) for the outside directors 
in our sample. This result is consistent with recent survey reports that more companies are 
increasing outside directors’ equity incentives in attempt to align their interests with 
shareholders’.4  
[Table 3 Here] 
                                                     
4 Papadopoulos, K. May 6, 2019. Update on U.S. Director Pay. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Financial Regulation. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/06/update-on-u-s-director-pay/ 
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Correlation Matrix 
Next, we conduct bivariate analysis by obtaining the Pearson correlation coefficients of 
the major variables used in our test. Table 4 shows that DECPCT is negatively correlated with 
both CETR3Y (-0.10, significant at p=0.01) and GETR3Y (-0.08, significant at p=0.01). These 
results provide preliminary evidence that firms that grant outside directors higher equity-
based compensation are associated with higher tax avoidance. The correlations of other 
variables are generally consistent with the literature.  
[Table 4 Here] 
Regression Results 
Table 5 presents the 2SLS regression results. The first-stage regression in column (1) 
shows that the instrument BDMTG is not significant but BDOWN has a negative and 
significant coefficient (p<0.01). This suggests that director equity incentives are decreasing 
with director ownership, consistent with the expectation. The first-stage partial F test is 
statistically significant (F=14.65, p<0.01), suggesting that the instruments are jointly 
relevant.5 The second-stage regression results show that our main variable of interest 
PRE_DECPCT is negatively associated with both three-year cash ETR (coefficient=-0.23, 
significant at p<0.05) and three-year GAAP ETR (coefficient=-0.627, significant at p<0.05). 
These findings suggest that firms engage in more tax avoidance when they grant higher 
equity-based compensation to outside directors. The results are consistent with equity 
compensation providing long-term incentives for outside directors to protect shareholder 
interests by encouraging managers to perform better tax planning.  
[Table 5 Here] 
Robustness Tests 
                                                     
5 The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis (F=93.14), indicating that the chosen 
instruments are jointly relevant in the first-stage and less likely to suffer from the weak instrument problem. 
Moreover, Hansen J-statistic on the test of overidentifying restrictions is insignificantly different from zero (p 
value=0.92), suggesting that the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction criterion. 
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We conduct several sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, we 
use total equity-based compensation (DECAMT, measured by the natural logarithm of the 
sum of stock awards and option awards) as an alternative measure of equity incentives. While 
the percentage of equity-based compensation reflects the relative incentives, the total amount 
of equity compensation captures the magnitude of total incentives. The results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 6.  
[Table 6 Here] 
Column (1) of Table 6 reports the first-stage regression results, showing that outside 
director equity compensation is positively related to BDMTG and negatively related to 
BDOWN. The results in the second-stage regression consistently show a negative and 
significant coefficient on PRE_DECAMT for both cash ETR and GAAP ETR. Therefore, this 
sensitivity analysis still supports our main finding that firms engage in more tax avoidance 
when they provide a higher level of equity compensation to outside directors.    
Second, our main analyses use long-term effective tax rates to measure tax avoidance. 
Following prior research, we also use industry-adjusted current-period cash ETR (CETR) and 
GAAP ETR (GETR) as a robustness check. The results of this analysis are reported in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. For brevity the first-stage regression results are not tabulated. 
We find that PRE_DECPCT is negatively and significantly associated with both current cash 
ETR (coefficient=-0.249, significant at p<0.05) and current GAAP ETR (coefficient=-0.948, 
significant at p<0.05). Therefore, combined with Table 5 these results suggest that firms tend 
to have lower effective tax rates, both short-term and long-term, when outside directors have 
higher equity incentives. 
In addition to effective tax rate, prior studies also use unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) 
as another tax avoidance measure (Rego and Wilson 2012; Lisowsky et al. 2013; Armstrong 
et al. 2015). UTBs represent the amount of income taxes associated with uncertain tax 
positions and are considered one proxy for risky tax planning. Thus our third robustness test 
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uses UTB as the dependent variable in the second-stage regression. Higher UTB indicates a 
greater level of tax avoidance. The results of this analysis are reported in column (3) of Table 
7. We find a positive and significant coefficient on PRE_DECPCT, suggesting that higher 
equity incentives for outside directors are associated with more aggressive tax management. 
Overall, our inferences are robust to different tax avoidance measures.  
[Table 7 Here] 
5. Additional Analyses 
In this section we perform conditional tests to examine the cross-sectional variations in 
the relation between outside director equity incentives and tax avoidance.  
The Effect of Business Strategy 
Miles and Snow (1978) identify two distinct business strategies that will affect a firm’s 
tax planning strategy. More specifically, firms that follow a cost leadership strategy, 
characterized as defenders, tend to minimize their exposure to risk and uncertainty, whereas 
firms that follow an innovative strategy, characterized as prospectors, tend to actively pursue 
new opportunities and engage in more risk-taking activities. Consistent with this theoretical 
framework, empirical studies provide evidence supporting that defenders (prospectors) have 
lower (higher) levels of tax avoidance (Higgins et al. 2015; Hsu et al. 2018).  
Since the board of directors plays a key role in formulating a firm’s business strategy as 
well as tax management strategy, we examine whether the documented association between 
equity incentives and tax avoidance varies with the firm’s business strategy type. Following 
Bentely et al. (2013), we identify a firm’s type of business strategy based on the following six 
variables: (1) the ratio of research and development expense to sales, (2) the ratio of 
employees to sales, (3) annual percentage change in total sales, (4) the ratio of SG&A 
expense to sales, (5) standard deviation of total employees, and (6) the ratio of net PPE to 
total assets. To construct a composite measure, we rank each of the six variables by forming 
quintiles within each two-digit SIC industry-year. Observations in the top quintile receive a 
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score of 5 and those in the lowest quintile are given a score of 1. Then for each firm-year we 
sum the scores across the six variables such that the maximum (minimum) strategy score a 
firm could receive is 30 (6). Higher strategy scores represent prospector types while lower 
strategy scores represent defender types. We partition our sample into defenders and 
prospectors based on the median value of the strategy score and perform the main analyses 
for the two subsamples. The results are summarized in Table 8.  
[Table 8 Here] 
Columns (1) and (2) measure tax avoidance by three-year cash ETR. The results show 
that the coefficient on PRE_DECPCT is significantly negative (coefficient=-0.293, 
significant at p<0.05) in the group of defender-type firms but not significant in the group of 
prospector-type firms. The Wald test yields a statistically significant Chi-squared statistic of 
1.74, suggesting that the effect of outside director equity incentives is significantly different 
among the two subsamples. More specifically, the negative relation between equity incentives 
and tax avoidance is more pronounced in firms adopting the defender-type business strategy, 
consistent with the findings in Hsu et al. (2018). We obtain similar results in columns (3) and 
(4) where the dependent variable is three-year GAAP ETR: PRE_DECPCT has a negative 
and significant (insignificant) coefficient in the subsample with the defender (prospector) 
strategy, and the Wald test (Chi-squared statistic=1.48, p value<0.1) suggests a significantly 
different coefficient across the two subsamples. Taken together, the results in Table 8 suggest 
that higher equity incentives facilitate outside directors’ monitoring role in encouraging 
mangers to adopt a tax planning strategy consistent with the firm’s business strategy.  
The Effect of Financial Constraints 
The corporate finance theory posits that financial constraints are frictions that prevent 
firms from making all desired investments (Lamont et al. 2001). Firms facing higher financial 
constraints experience an increase in the cost of external financing or an increase in the 
difficulty of accessing external funds (Whited and Wu 2006). As a result, financially 
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constrained firms need to seek for alternative sources to fund operations, among which tax 
savings become an important source of internal financing. Law and Mills (2015) and 
Edwards et al. (2016) both provide evidence that firms with increased financial constraints 
engage more heavily in tax avoidance. Therefore, in this section we effect of outside director 
equity incentives on tax avoidance is conditional on firms’ financial constraints.  
We use two commonly used measures of financial constraints: the WW Index proposed 
by Whited and Wu (2006) and the SA Index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Then 
we divided the sample into high-constraint and low-constraint groups based on the industry 
median of the financial constraint index. The results of this cross-sectional test are presented 
in Table 9.  
Panel A of Table 9 uses WW Index as the measure of financial constraints. For both cash 
ETR and GAAP ETR, the results indicate a significantly negative coefficient on 
PRE_DECPCT in the high-constraint sample. Panel B of Table 9 uses the SA Index to 
measure financial constraints. We obtain consistent results that PRE_DECPCT is negative 
and significant in the high-constraint sample but not significant in the low-constraint sample. 
These findings collectively suggest that outside directors’ equity incentives have a stronger 
effect on tax avoidance in firms facing higher financial constraints, consistent with financially 
constrained firms having a greater demand for internally generated funds through tax 
planning.  
[Table 9 Here] 
6. Conclusion 
To enhance the link between directors’ monetary incentives and firm performance, many 
companies award directors large stock and option grants that are more closely tied to the 
firm’s stock price performance. As equity-based compensation of directors becomes more 
popular, it is important to examine the consequences of this form of compensation. Advocates 
of incentive compensation argue that, by providing ownership incentives, equity-based pay 
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can motivate directors to focus on maximizing stock returns and shareholder value. On the 
other hand, however, focusing on stock prices might hamper directors’ independent 
monitoring as they become more short-sighted. In this study, we examine how these two 
contrasting incentives affect a firm’s tax planning decisions.  
We find that firms that pay a higher proportion of outside directors’ compensation in the 
form of equity have lower long-term effective tax rates, consistent with equity-based 
incentives aligning managers’ interests with shareholder interests. We also find that the 
positive effect of outside director equity incentives on tax avoidance is more pronounced in 
firms adopting a prospector business strategy and in firms that are more financially 
constrained. Overall the findings collectively suggest that equity-based compensation helps 
motivate outside directors to perform better advising and monitoring so that managers engage 
in more tax avoidance to maximize shareholder wealth. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
CETR3Yi,t+1 Industry-adjusted three-year cash effective tax rate, computed as 
the firm’s mean three-year cash ETR (cash tax payment scaled 
by pre-tax income) minus the industry (based on 2-digit SIC 
code) mean three-year cash ETR  
GETR3Yi,t+1 Industry-adjusted three-year GAAP effective tax rate, computed 
as the firm’s mean three-year GAAP ETR (total tax expense 
scaled by pre-tax income) minus the industry (based on 2-digit 
SIC code) mean three-year GAAP ETR 
DECPCTi,t The sum of stock awards and option awards divided by the total 
compensation of outside directors 
BDMTGi,t Number of board meetings during the year 
BDOWNi,t Number of shares held by executives and directors divided by 
total number of outstanding shares 
SIZEi,t Natural logarithm of net sales 
LEVi,t Long-term debt divided by lagged total assets 
TBQi,t The sum of market value of common stock, book value of 
preferred stock, and book value of total debt divided by book 
value of lagged total assets 
RDi,t Research and development expense scaled by lagged total assets 
INTANi,t Total intangible assets divided by lagged total assets 
CAPEXi,t Capital expenditures divided by lagged total assets 
SGAi,t Selling, general and administrative expense scaled by lagged 
total assets 
PTCFOi,t Pre-tax operating cash flows (net cash flows from operations 
plus cash taxes) scaled by lagged total assets 
FOREIGNi,t An indicator equal to one if the firm reports foreign sales, and 
zero otherwise 
LOSSi,t An indicator equal to one if the firm has net operating loss, and 
zero otherwise 
DUALITYi,t An indicator equal to one if the CEO also serves as the board 
chairman, and zero otherwise 
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BDSIZEi,t Number of directors on the board 
COMPAGEi,t Firm age, measured by the number of years the firm has been 
included in Compustat 
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Table 1 Sample Selection Process 
Selection Criteria Observations Firms 
Compustat coverage 2006~2018 118,511 16,318 
Less:   
Missing three-year effective tax rates (49,954) (5,841) 
Negative effective tax rates (15,546) (414) 
Not covered in Execucomp  (40,547) (8,042) 
Missing data on other variables (4,932) (653) 
Final sample during 2006~2015 7,532 1,368 
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Table 2 Sample Distribution by Year and by Industry 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year  Number of Firms Percentage 
2006  575 7.63% 
2007  773 10.26% 
2008  741 9.84% 
2009  770 10.22% 
2010  832 11.05% 
2011  853 11.32% 
2012  847 11.25% 
2013  824 10.94% 
2014  723 9.60% 
2015  594 7.89% 
Total  7,532 100.00% 
    
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
2-digit SIC code Industry Name Observations Percentage 
01~09 Agricultures 18 0.24% 
10~14 Mining 134 1.78% 
15~17 Construction 98 1.30% 
20~39 Manufacturing 3,047 40.45% 
40~49 Transportation 590 7.83% 
50~59 Retail 1,092 14.50% 
60~67 Financial, Insurance, 
Real Estate 
1,260 16.73% 
70~89 Services 1,221 16.21% 
99 Others 72 0.96% 
Total  7,532 100.00% 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics (N=7,532) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% 
CETR3Y -0.059 0.290 -1.593 -0.083 -0.007 0.051 0.409 
GETR3Y -0.176 0.895 -5.255 -0.070 -0.006 0.038 0.367 
DECPCT 0.517 0.210 0.000 0.425 0.532 0.646 0.962 
BDMTG 7.323 3.566 0.000 5.000 7.000 9.000 21.000 
BDOWN 0.105 0.159 0.000 0.019 0.042 0.110 0.816 
SIZE 7.675 1.596 4.261 6.504 7.547 8.738 11.588 
LEV 0.180 0.186 0.000 0.021 0.141 0.276 0.986 
TBQ 2.297 1.477 0.736 1.316 1.845 2.714 8.872 
RD 0.022 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.241 
INTAN 0.227 0.233 0.000 0.028 0.161 0.359 1.047 
CAPEX 0.044 0.048 0.000 0.013 0.030 0.058 0.300 
SGA 0.218 0.203 0.000 0.050 0.171 0.325 0.934 
PTCFO 0.158 0.108 -0.055 0.085 0.143 0.215 0.511 
FOREIGN 0.596 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOSS 0.666 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DUALITY 0.526 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BDSIZE 9.340 2.605 0.000 8.000 9.000 11.000 16.000 
COMPAGE 28.073 17.332 3.000 14.000 22.000 43.000 64.000 
Note: Variable definitions are summarized in the Appendix.  
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Table 4 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) CETR3Y 1.000                  
(2) GETR3Y 0.923 1.000                 
(3) DECPCT -0.101 -0.083 1.000                
(4) BDMTG -0.032 -0.029 -0.016 1.000               
(5) BDOWN 0.030 0.016 -0.150 -0.100 1.000              
(6) SIZE 0.033 0.038 0.098 0.079 -0.196 1.000             
(7) LEV 0.027 0.047 0.063 0.050 -0.059 0.195 1.000            
(8) TBQ -0.100 -0.096 0.243 -0.118 0.027 -0.148 -0.015 1.000           
(9) RD -0.129 -0.098 0.245 -0.002 -0.055 -0.158 -0.120 0.318 1.000          
(10) INTAN -0.127 -0.131 0.164 0.057 -0.018 0.096 0.345 0.059 0.042 1.000         
(11) CAPEX 0.030 0.047 0.079 -0.086 0.062 -0.011 0.092 0.213 -0.055 -0.205 1.000        
(12) SGA -0.028 -0.052 0.142 -0.118 0.142 -0.074 -0.100 0.374 0.227 0.043 0.123 1.000       
(13) PTCFO -0.005 -0.047 0.179 -0.147 0.078 -0.031 -0.026 0.667 0.157 0.035 0.370 0.427 1.000      
(14) FOREIGN -0.086 -0.094 0.202 -0.023 -0.094 0.248 0.074 0.067 0.231 0.266 -0.073 0.113 0.087 1.000     
(15) LOSS -0.057 -0.058 0.120 -0.115 0.045 0.026 0.042 0.104 0.109 0.133 0.074 0.184 0.172 0.169 1.000    
(16) DUALITY 0.039 0.043 0.001 -0.030 0.001 0.096 -0.003 -0.037 -0.029 -0.013 -0.018 -0.031 -0.028 0.012 -0.039 1.000   
(17) BDSIZE 0.020 0.036 -0.064 0.090 -0.161 0.418 0.040 -0.175 -0.145 -0.029 -0.129 -0.183 -0.208 0.004 -0.157 0.010 1.000  
(18) COMPAGE 0.066 0.073 -0.108 -0.021 -0.171 0.456 0.080 -0.193 -0.079 0.006 -0.024 -0.112 -0.125 0.170 -0.074 0.158 0.285 1.000 
This table describes the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal for the variables used in the regression. Significant correlations are indicated in bold (p<0.05, two-tailed test) and in italics (p<0.10, 
two-tailed test). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5 Outside Director Equity Incentives (Based on Proportion) and Tax Avoidance 
 First-Stage  Second-Stage 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Variable Expected Sign DECPCT  CETR3Y GETR3Y 
PRE_DECPCT ?   -0.230** -0.627** 
    (-2.01) (-2.16) 
BDMTG ? 0.000    
  (0.14)    
BDOWN ? -0.202***    
  (-5.41)    
SIZE ? 0.022***  0.002 0.008 
  (5.52)  (0.62) (0.90) 
LEV ? -0.018  0.004 0.080 
  (-0.70)  (0.20) (1.48) 
TBQ ＋ 0.022***  -0.012** -0.005 
  (5.56)  (-2.54) (-0.34) 
RD － 0.815***  -0.163 0.773* 
 (6.58)  (-1.13) (1.92) 
INTAN － 0.075***  -0.020 -0.052 
 (3.30)  (-0.95) (-1.02) 
CAPEX － 0.325***  -0.244** -0.310 
 (3.03)  (-1.98) (-0.88) 
SGA － 0.010  0.062** 0.049 
 (0.30)  (2.57) (0.86) 
PTCFO ＋ -0.103**  0.290*** 0.193 
 (-1.99)  (5.95) (1.52) 
FOREIGN ＋ 0.028**  0.012 0.013 
 (2.44)  (1.28) (0.55) 
LOSS － 0.000  -0.013* -0.029 
 (0.03)  (-1.87) (-1.63) 
DUALITY ＋ 0.018**  0.006 0.030* 
 (2.11)  (0.94) (1.78) 
BDSIZE － -0.001  -0.004** -0.005 
 (-0.33)  (-2.25) (-1.32) 
COMPAGE － -0.002***  -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-6.31)  (-1.86) (-1.92) 
Intercept 0.121***  0.073*** 0.242*** 
 (2.93)  (3.05) (4.10) 
N 7,532  7,532 7,532 
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Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2   0.303 0.355 
Partial F statistic 14.65***    
All firm-level continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
  
29 
 
Table 6 Outside Director Equity Incentives (Based on Total Level) and Tax Avoidance 
 First-Stage  Second-Stage 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Variable Expected Sign DECAMT  CETR3Y GETR3Y 
PRE_DECAMT ?   -0.019** -0.049** 
    (-2.00) (-2.05) 
BDMTG ? 0.023**    
  (2.54)    
BDOWN ? -2.328***    
  (-6.40)    
SIZE ? 0.328***  0.004 0.011 
  (10.90)  (0.83) (1.06) 
LEV ? 0.164  0.012 0.100* 
  (0.90)  (0.56) (1.88) 
TBQ ＋ 0.069**  -0.016*** -0.015 
  (2.33)  (-3.99) (-1.29) 
RD － 5.062***  -0.255** 0.512 
 (6.04)  (-2.15) (1.52) 
INTAN － 0.508***  -0.027 -0.073 
 (3.66)  (-1.41) (-1.56) 
CAPEX － 1.873**  -0.284** -0.421 
 (2.54)  (-2.45) (-1.27) 
SGA － -0.022  0.060*** 0.044 
 (-0.09)  (2.60) (0.81) 
PTCFO ＋ -0.832***  0.296*** 0.214* 
 (-2.65)  (6.28) (1.75) 
FOREIGN ＋ 0.295***  0.011 0.010 
 (3.39)  (1.26) (0.45) 
LOSS － -0.011  -0.014** -0.030* 
 (-0.18)  (-1.97) (-1.74) 
DUALITY ＋ -0.088  0.001 0.015 
 (-1.35)  (0.10) (0.95) 
BDSIZE － 0.061***  -0.003 -0.002 
 (4.35)  (-1.39) (-0.46) 
COMPAGE － -0.011***  -0.000 -0.001 
 (-4.08)  (-1.37) (-1.32) 
Intercept 0.173  0.053* 0.189*** 
 (0.47)  (1.90) (2.77) 
N 7,528  7,528 7,528 
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Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2   0.315 0.366 
All firm-level continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
DECAMT is measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of stock awards and option awards. All other variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 7 Alternative Tax Avoidance Measures 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Expected Sign CETR GETR UTB 
PRE_DECPCT ？ -0.249** -0.948** 1.587* 
  (-1.97) (-2.57) (1.92) 
SIZE ? 0.001 0.006 0.889*** 
  (0.25) (0.56) (28.89) 
LEV ? -0.017 0.020 0.198 
  (-0.74) (0.31) (1.39) 
TBQ ＋ -0.021*** -0.002 0.045* 
  (-4.17) (-0.13) (1.81) 
RD － -0.230 0.680 6.157*** 
  (-1.59) (1.57) (6.72) 
INTAN － -0.015 -0.049 -0.037 
  (-0.65) (-0.69) (-0.24) 
CAPEX － -0.224** -0.038 -2.446*** 
  (-2.02) (-0.12) (-4.28) 
SGA － 0.055** 0.052 -0.790*** 
  (2.22) (0.76) (-4.37) 
PTCFO ＋ 0.436*** 0.276* -0.257 
  (8.30) (1.81) (-0.84) 
FOREIGN ＋ 0.015 0.011 0.461*** 
  (1.52) (0.44) (6.93) 
LOSS － -0.014* -0.029 -0.027 
  (-1.73) (-1.20) (-0.53) 
DUALITY ＋ 0.001 0.018 -0.032 
  (0.16) (0.94) (-0.63) 
BDSIZE － -0.002 -0.002 0.032*** 
  (-0.94) (-0.51) (2.82) 
COMPAGE － -0.001* -0.002* 0.005** 
  (-1.89) (-1.81) (2.19) 
Intercept 0.070*** 0.295*** -7.332*** 
 (2.95) (4.55) (-15.43) 
N 9,900 9,900 8,872 
Industry and Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Std Error Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.146 0.159 0.614 
All firm-level continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All other 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 8 Conditional Test: The Effect of Business Strategy 
 CETR3Y GETR3Y 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
(1) 
Defenders 
(2) 
Prospectors 
(3) 
Defenders 
(4) 
Prospectors 
PRE_ DECPCT ？ -0.293** -0.080 -0.852** -0.248 
  (-2.15) (-0.63) (-2.32) (-0.65) 
SIZE ？ 0.006 -0.004 0.014 -0.000 
  (1.09) (-0.93) (1.04) (-0.01) 
LEV － 0.020 0.011 0.145* 0.056 
  (0.68) (0.37) (1.81) (0.67) 
TBQ ＋ -0.005 -0.018*** 0.006 -0.014 
  (-0.86) (-2.67) (0.36) (-0.72) 
RD － 0.104 -0.480*** 1.435* -0.035 
  (0.38) (-2.92) (1.82) (-0.07) 
INTAN － -0.028 -0.039 -0.017 -0.126 
  (-0.91) (-1.24) (-0.21) (-1.53) 
CAPEX － -0.177 -0.356 -0.168 -0.822 
  (-1.28) (-1.50) (-0.41) (-1.24) 
SGA － 0.030 0.084** -0.047 0.118 
  (0.84) (2.22) (-0.45) (1.30) 
PTCFO ＋ 0.283*** 0.316*** 0.215 0.240 
  (4.69) (4.37) (1.37) (1.18) 
FOREIGN ＋ 0.014 0.021 0.042 0.006 
  (1.11) (1.49) (1.17) (0.18) 
LOSS － -0.022** -0.006 -0.025 -0.032 
  (-2.42) (-0.57) (-1.11) (-1.16) 
DUALITY ＋ 0.004 0.003 0.029 0.015 
  (0.41) (0.28) (1.14) (0.60) 
BDSIZE － -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.000 
  (-1.59) (-0.89) (-1.32) (-0.01) 
COMPAGE － -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* -0.000 
  (-1.28) (-0.44) (-1.69) (-0.46) 
Intercept 0.042 0.199** 0.166** 0.570** 
 (1.29) (2.55) (2.02) (2.54) 
N 4,092 3,222 4,092 3,222 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.283 0.332 0.346 0.363 
Defenders (prospectors) refer to firms that have a strategy score below (above) the sample median, where strategy scores are 
calculated following Bentley et al. (2013). All firm-level continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. 
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Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 9 Conditional Test: The Effect of Financial Constraints 
Panel A: Financial constraints measured by WW index 
 CETR3Y GETR3Y 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
(1) 
High WW 
(2) 
Low WW 
(3) 
High WW 
(4) 
Low WW 
PRE_ DECPCT ？ -0.418* -0.092 -1.061* -0.268 
  (-1.96) (-0.72) (-1.81) (-0.93) 
SIZE ？ 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.006 
  (1.10) (-0.55) (0.16) (0.52) 
LEV － -0.018 0.024 0.001 0.151* 
  (-0.58) (0.75) (0.02) (1.71) 
TBQ ＋ -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 0.011 
  (-1.35) (-1.46) (-0.36) (0.49) 
RD － -0.014 -0.244 0.996 0.495 
  (-0.06) (-1.43) (1.44) (1.13) 
INTAN － 0.000 -0.020 0.011 -0.095 
  (0.01) (-0.77) (0.10) (-1.52) 
CAPEX － -0.132 -0.371* -0.111 -0.734 
  (-0.72) (-1.94) (-0.21) (-1.46) 
SGA － 0.040 0.076* 0.042 0.009 
  (1.18) (1.87) (0.48) (0.09) 
PTCFO ＋ 0.305*** 0.271*** 0.216 0.163 
  (4.80) (3.34) (1.30) (0.74) 
FOREIGN ＋ 0.012 0.003 0.022 -0.010 
  (0.88) (0.21) (0.60) (-0.31) 
LOSS － -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.045** 
  (-1.01) (-1.41) (-0.42) (-1.96) 
DUALITY ＋ 0.014 -0.004 0.043 0.020 
  (1.20) (-0.46) (1.42) (0.88) 
BDSIZE － -0.006** -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-2.46) (-0.53) (-0.35) (-0.59) 
COMPAGE － -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
  (-1.50) (-0.81) (-1.58) (-1.17) 
Intercept 0.042 0.046 0.095*** 0.269** 
 (1.29) (0.88) (2.69) (2.03) 
N 4,092 3,222 4,092 3,222 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 3,383 4,024 3,383 4,024 
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Panel B: Financial constraints measured by SA index 
 CETR3Y GETR3Y 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
(1) 
High SA 
(2) 
Low SA 
(3) 
High SA 
(4) 
Low SA 
PRE_ DECPCT ？ -0.389* -0.073 -1.114* -0.106 
  (-1.80) (-0.70) (-1.93) (-0.48) 
SIZE ？ 0.009 -0.004 0.017 -0.004 
  (1.30) (-0.96) (1.02) (-0.35) 
LEV － 0.013 -0.021 0.133* -0.003 
  (0.42) (-0.70) (1.69) (-0.04) 
TBQ ＋ -0.012* -0.009 -0.005 0.002 
  (-1.72) (-1.32) (-0.23) (0.08) 
RD － -0.020 -0.374** 1.314** -0.000 
  (-0.09) (-2.05) (2.06) (-0.00) 
INTAN － 0.009 -0.035 -0.001 -0.089 
  (0.25) (-1.35) (-0.01) (-1.44) 
CAPEX － -0.127 -0.259 -0.036 -0.481 
  (-0.68) (-1.40) (-0.07) (-0.97) 
SGA － 0.092*** 0.031 0.135 -0.069 
  (2.67) (0.74) (1.53) (-0.67) 
PTCFO ＋ 0.267*** 0.300*** 0.229 0.158 
  (4.08) (3.85) (1.30) (0.77) 
FOREIGN ＋ 0.006 0.009 0.018 -0.006 
  (0.40) (0.75) (0.47) (-0.22) 
LOSS － -0.005 -0.017* -0.021 -0.029 
  (-0.43) (-1.92) (-0.67) (-1.34) 
DUALITY ＋ 0.020 -0.002 0.050 0.021 
  (1.57) (-0.27) (1.48) (1.08) 
BDSIZE － -0.006* -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 
  (-1.71) (-0.48) (-0.72) (-0.46) 
COMPAGE － -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
  (-0.93) (-0.10) (-0.91) (-0.28) 
Intercept 0.042 0.002 0.125*** 0.073 
 (1.29) (0.05) (3.80) (0.70) 
N 4,092 3,222 4,092 3,222 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 3,732 3,800 3,732 3,800 
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All firm-level continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
